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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Factors Affecting Continuation of Operations at Malta.

1. SECURITY. Entire operation which has been mounted by the British from Malta is known in almost every detail to the Greeks and the Italians and probably, to considerable extent, to other services. For example, the Italian Service knows that the training has taken place in Malta and that the Pixies have been put ashore by British boat. Its name and the name of its captain are both known. The Pixies know that they have been trained at Malta and by British officers. They also know that they have been put ashore by British crews. In the event of capture they will certainly reveal all of this regardless of any cover story which may have been given to them. In that respect, this security makes the operation very similar to the original concept of the Valuable Operation. The existence of the Corfu base is also known. The British teams have been using short wave radio-telephone, which has undoubtedly been monitored and DF'd by now.

2. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS. Operations on Malta will cease on December 1. We have as yet no commitment for the location of a permanent base elsewhere. The original commitment of the British to allow a base to be established at Cyrenaica has been withdrawn. The location of a permanent base is a prerequisite for the completion of the operation. Until

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such time as a base is secured, established, and manned, it will be impossible to infiltrate to further parties either for reconnaissance or for more active operational purposes.

3. CURRENT STATUS OF RECRUITING. The Pixie leaders have repeatedly postponed the date on which they promised to provide at least twenty additional men for the reconnaissance teams. Present promises provide for the delivery of these men on or about November 1. The next period at which sea infiltration could be carried out is from November 21 to 30. This would allow only three weeks for training at Malta. Any further delay in shipping the men to Malta would reduce the time available for training to the point where such training would be wholly inadequate.

4. COMMUNICATIONS. For the next teams to be infiltrated it is planned to use ultra high frequency radio-telephone communications from the ground to an aircraft cruising off the Albanian coast. We have as yet been unable to secure such an aircraft, although it does seem probable that we will be able to make some sort of arrangements. The provision of these communications and of the communications aircraft is ~~an absolute~~ prerequisite for the infiltration of any further reconnaissance parties.

5. GREEK MILITARY SITUATION. A major objective of the FIEND operation was to counter the Greek Guerrilla attack based in Albania. At least for the time being, the Greek guerrillas have completely withdrawn from Greece into Albania or have been captured or dispersed. This objective no longer applies, and hence the urgency in proceeding with FIEND is somewhat less than when the project was originally conceived.

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6. CONCLUSIONS. Because of the withdrawal of the British offer to provide a base in Cyrenaica, we do not at the present time have any facilities which will permit carrying the TIEND operation beyond the infiltration of the four additional parties now planned. If this additional infiltration is carried out, these men will, if successful, provide us during the winter with a certain amount of intelligence about conditions inside. In any case, we will not be able to capitalize on such information until late winter or early spring. Further, it is questionable whether or not the Pixie recruiting officers will be able to provide, by the date required, the men for the next four parties. Further, these teams, if captured, will certainly divulge details of their training at Malta and of their infiltration. Although this would certainly be laid to the British, our own participation might be revealed also.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended (a) we instruct Burke to suspend all activity pointing toward infiltration, but with the understanding present plans and action can continue provided the Albanian leaders furnish suitable recruits in time for their training on Malta to be completed by 21 November 1949; (b) we continue efforts to reconstitute the Committee and conduct propaganda in its name.

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